Akademiska Hus – New Public Management Goes Rogue in Sweden

This blog post is based on an article published in Social Policy and Society by Johan Nordensvärd, Matti Kaulio, Carl-Johan Sommar and Markus Ketola.

Sweden’s experience demonstrates that quasi-market reforms can create systems that look competitive but are tightly controlled, reinforcing state authority and managerialism. University estates and museum properties illustrate the consequences: high rents, budgetary pressure, and the potential closure of public institutions. While framed as technical and efficiency-driven, these reforms are deeply political, shaping how resources are allocated and who has authority. In the Swedish case, neither citizens, students, nor museum visitors are “queens” in this arrangement; the real beneficiaries are state institutions and the bureaucratic and financial structures they maintain.

From Welfare Model to Market Logic

When Gøsta Esping-Andersen wrote about welfare states, Sweden was often described as an archetypal social democratic welfare state. At the time, it was a model of comprehensive public provision. Today, neoliberal policies, such as school choice, with profit-driven companies competing for tax-funded vouchers, have introduced market logic into traditionally public sectors. Neoliberal reforms rarely have a clear endpoint. Instead, they generate systems that combine contradictory logics. Almost 40 years since the introduction of New Public Management (NPM), the promised improvements in efficiency, reductions in state power, or gains in better services for the public still remain to be seen. 

While embracing the rhetoric of competition and consumer choice, NPM reforms have entrenched state control. One striking example is university real estate. Universities rely on their buildings for teaching, research, and institutional prestige. In Sweden, most university buildings are owned by a state-owned company, Akademiska Hus, which is required to generate a financial return. Universities pay rent from their government appropriations, and Akademiska Hus returns profits to the state, creating a circular flow of public money. Even if the government increases funding for a university, much of that money can be taken back through higher rents. 

These kinds of quasi-markets are based on distrust and the assumption that universities cannot manage their buildings effectively. While market rhetoric is used to justify structural control, the effect is to depoliticise public institutions and place financial and managerial decisions in the hands of technocrats rather than elected officials. However, just as the mind cannot be separated from the body, political intentions cannot be separated from the organisation of universities. NPM, through the language of competition and choice, tries to mask this relationship, but the underlying power dynamics remain.

Cultural Institutions Under Pressure

The consequences extend beyond universities as museums and other cultural institutions face similar pressures. Statens fastighetsverk, the government agency responsible for managing state-owned properties, charges market-based rents to the institutions that occupy these buildings. This includes historic sites, government offices, and museums. In practice, these rents are rising significantly. For example, the Museum of Ethnography in Stockholm faces a proposed 57% rent increase, equivalent to more than 12 million kronor per year. The Världskulturmuseerna (World Culture Museums), which includes the Museum of Ethnography, anticipates that similar increases could force closures unless additional funding is provided. Without intervention, these museums may be left with buildings but no ability to deliver exhibitions, education, or programmes. In effect, a state-driven quasi-market in property is undermining public cultural institutions, just as it shapes university governance.

University estates are critical to teaching, research, and institutional identity, yet they are largely out of the institutions’ control. With most buildings owned by Akademiska Hus, universities must treat rent as an unavoidable operational cost. The state uses market-like mechanisms to discipline institutions, all while maintaining centralised control over financing, pricing, and performance regulation. What appears as market competition is, in reality, a tool of governance that reinforces existing hierarchies and managerial authority. 

Ultimately, Sweden’s quasi-market reforms have gone rogue, creating hybrid systems that benefit neither students, citizens, nor museum visitors. Public funds circulate in loops that primarily serve government and state-owned enterprises. Far from embodying neoliberal ideals of freedom or efficiency, these systems resemble Frankenstein hybrids: a mixture of state oversight, financialisation, and market simulation that serves administrative ends rather than the public interest.

---

Reference

Nordensvärd, Johan, Matti Kaulio, Carl-Johan Sommar, and Markus Ketola. 2026. “Political Ghosts in the Swedish Welfare Machine: De-Politicisation, Neoliberal Technocracy and Quasi-Markets in Swedish University Property Management.” Social Policy and Society: 1–19. doi: 10.1017/S1474746425101279.

About the Authors

Johan Nordensvärd is a Lecturer in Management and Technology, KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden.

Matti Kaulio is Professor in Management and Technology, KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden.

Carl-Johan Sommar is a Postdoctoral Researcher in Management and Engineering, Linköping University, Sweden.

Markus Ketola is Senior Lecturer in Global and International Social Policy, University of Edinburgh, UK.