When hurting migrants became bad for everyone’s health – what the pandemic revealed about Europe’s policy priorities and the need for a healthier future

This blog is based on an article published in Social Policy and Society by Michael Strange, Louise Dalingwater, Slobodan Zdravkovic, and Elisabeth Mangrio.

Only five years after it emerged, the Covid-19 pandemic already feels distant. For all its lasting impact on human life and society, the moment of introspection it provided – as a crisis – was fleeting. In our article, ‘Navigating the contradictory politics of being a marginalised migrant during Covid-19’, we’ve sought to remember how three European welfare states acted towards some of the most vulnerable individuals within their borders. We compare three states – France, Sweden, and the United Kingdom – to ask what we can learn about building more resilient and just societies today.

An unequal leveller

Covid-19 first looked to be a leveller – everyone was affected, with even the UK prime minister hospitalised. But soon it became clear that recovery times and mortality rates varied greatly, mirroring existing societal inequalities. Already in March 2020, governments were warned that marginalised populations, including refugees and other vulnerable migrants, faced significant risks due to existing barriers to healthcare, including discrimination. The warning came in a joint report from the World Health Organization (WHO), International Organization for Migration (IOM), the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Organisations (IFRC). To assess whether France, Sweden, and the UK followed that guidance, we analysed policy decisions across 2020 and asked civil-society organisations supporting migrants what they observed in practice.

Intentional failure

Sweden, France, and the UK represent a spectrum of welfare models – with the balance between state and market shifting from social democratic, to conservative, and liberal. It is initially unsurprising then that marginalised migrants in Sweden received the most state support, whilst in France help was patchier and heavily reliant on civil society, and what assistance was available in the UK came almost entirely from civil society and the private sector. A common pattern in all three countries was that the state grossly underperformed, failing to provide basic services essential for universal health coverage. At the same time, all three states either perpetuated or failed to counter anti-migrant stigma. This was ironic given the extent to which migrants were often employed in essential jobs (for example, in healthcare, transport, and food production) in which they were both key to the functioning of the host country but also disproportionately exposed to the pandemic. Yet this can be explained as part of a longer ideological shift characterised by two developments: first, an intentional withdrawal of the state from its welfare role; and second, the prioritisation of migration control over other social policy goals. Both these developments have significant implications for the value of human life.

Migration management undermined population health

The pandemic revealed in all three countries a politics – normally more easily hidden – in which the spectre of death has become normalised as a tool for controlling migrants. Despite clear security and economic incentives to prioritise population health during the pandemic, measures needed to prevent exposure to Covid and limit its effect largely excluded marginalised migrants in these three exemplar European countries. Even where the UK formally allowed free Covid tests and vaccines for all, unclear guidance for NHS workers and migrants – combined with persistent stigma – severely limited their accessibility. In all three countries, migration has often been framed as a threat to the welfare state. Yet, the pandemic revealed both the extent to which that system is dependent upon migrant labour, as well as how much societal norms have shifted such that illness within parts of the population has become socially acceptable and prioritised over traditionally much higher policy goals.

Confused policy goals

Five years on, Covid may feel like nothing more than the flu for most of us. In contrast, the effects of migration management in all three of the countries considered have significantly increased. In looking back to 2020, our paper seeks first to remind us all that the pandemic evidenced a point at which migration management had become prioritised over public health and wellbeing, with implications also for national security and the economy. Even if migration remains central in political debate, we hope most people calling for further migration management do so believing it serves broader goals (e.g. ‘protecting hospital budgets’) rather than pure xenophobia. The pandemic showed how far things had shifted, such that migration management had come to undermine other policy goals like population health. But, based on what we know, how might these three European countries do things differently?

A secure future requires ensuring good health for all

A starting point would be to reiterate universal health coverage as both a goal and a foundation of the European welfare state. Next, it is necessary to explicitly reject exclusion from healthcare at both a central level and also throughout the healthcare system such that there is no ambiguity over migrants’ rights to universal health coverage. From our perspective, universal health coverage also requires addressing the social determinants of health: access to decent accommodation, a decent standard of living, and the removal of barriers to healthcare provision more generally. For that to be possible it is necessary to actively fight anti-migrant stigma, making clear what role migrants play in supporting society overall. And finally, it needs to be unacceptable to use threats to the wellbeing or health of individuals as a legitimate means of migration control.

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Reference

Strange, Michael, Louise Dalingwater, Slobodan Zdravkovic, and Elisabeth Mangrio. 2025. “Navigating the Contradictory Politics of Being a Marginalised Migrant during Covid-19.” Social Policy and Society: 1–15. doi: 10.1017/S1474746425100833.

About the authors

Michael Strange is Reader in International Relations at Malmö University, Sweden.

Louise Dalingwater is Professor of British Politics and Health Policy at Sorbonne University, Paris, France.

Slobodan Zdravkovic is Associate Professor in Public Health and Epidemiology at Malmö University, Sweden.

Elisabeth Mangrio is Associate Professor of Health and Society at Malmö University, Sweden.